Why Event Studies Do Not Detect Anti-Competitive Mergers

Anticompetitive mergers increase competitors' profits, since they reduce competition. Using a model of endogenous mergers, we show that such mergers nevertheless may reduce the competitors' share-prices. Thus, event-studies can not detect anti-competitive mergers.

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Year of publication:	2000
Authors:	Fridolfsson, Sven-Olof ; Stennek, Johan
Publisher:	Stockholm : The Research Institute of Industrial Economics (IUI)
Subject:	Fusion \| Wohlfahrtsanalyse \| Börsenkurs \| Theorie \| Mergers & Acquisitions \| Event Studies \| Antitrust \| Coalition Formation

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Series:	IUI Working Paper ; 542
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Type of publication (narrower categories):	Working Paper
Language:	English
Other identifiers:	hdl:10419/94988 [Handle] RePEc:hhs:iuiwop:0542 [RePEc]
Classification:	G14 - Information and Market Efficiency; Event Studies ; G34 - Mergers; Acquisitions; Restructuring; Corporate Governance ; L12 - Monopoly; Monopolization Strategies ; L41 - Monopolization; Horizontal Anticompetitive Practices
Source:	EconStor

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010334958