Why pay child benefits to mothers? The "feminist" case for paying benefits to mothers rests on the idea that women may suffer if they have no independent access to economic resources. The "maternalist" case for targeting benefits to mothers rests on the idea that money paid to mothers is more likely to be spent in ways that benefit children. This paper answers the question "Why pay child benefits to mothers?" by asking how households manage their finances. I begin by considering the feminist case for using child benefits to alleviate women's economic dependence. I examine the extent of women's economic dependence first, by considering women's own access to earnings. I then examine unwaged women's dependence on men's incomes. Is income generally placed into a single pool, to which both parents have access, or do partners control their own incomes? How much access to income do unwaged parents enjoy? I then turn to the maternalist case for paying benefits to women. I begin by examining the question of whether or not women, generally speaking, treat their incomes differently from men, and trace the flow of child tax benefits through the household. Do child benefits get deposited into a joint account, an account in one of the parents' names, or an account in the child's name? Is it treated the same way as employment income, or differently? How important are these credits in the overall financial flows of the household?
