Winners and losers of early elections: on the welfare implications of political blockades and early elections
We develop a dynamic model of political competition. Each party has a policymotivated ideological wing and an office-motivated opportunistic wing. A blockade arises if inner-party conflict stops policy implementation. We use this model to study whether early elections should be used to overcome a blockade. They have the advantage that urgent decisions are no longer delayed, and the disadvantage that unsuccessful governments gain additional time in office. This may give rise to a time inconsistency. Voters are in favour of a constitution without early elections. However, in the middle of a political crisis, they are willing to abandon it.
Year of publication: |
2008
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Authors: | Bierbrauer, Felix ; Mechtenberg, Lydia |
Publisher: |
Berlin : Humboldt University of Berlin, Collaborative Research Center 649 - Economic Risk |
Subject: | Wahl | Ideologie | Politische Partei | Wettbewerb | Public Choice | Wohlfahrtseffekt | Theorie | Early elections | political blockades | ideological rigidities |
Saved in:
freely available
Series: | SFB 649 Discussion Paper ; 2008,071 |
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Type of publication: | Book / Working Paper |
Type of publication (narrower categories): | Working Paper |
Language: | English |
Other identifiers: | 590226401 [GVK] hdl:10419/25314 [Handle] |
Classification: | D72 - Economic Models of Political Processes: Rent-Seeking, Elections, Legistures, and Voting Behavior ; D61 - Allocative Efficiency; Cost-Benefit Analysis ; D82 - Asymmetric and Private Information |
Source: |
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010263756