Work incentives and household insurance: Sequential contracting with altruistic individuals and moral hazard

Two agents sequentially contracts with different principals under moral hazard. If agents care for one another, the second principal gains by insuring them over first wages. Even with independent tasks, the first principal must offer riskier payments to induce effort.

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Year of publication:	2006
Authors:	Aubert, Cécile
Institutions:	Université Paris-Dauphine (Paris IX)
Subject:	Incentives \| Altruism \| Moral hazard

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Extent:	application/pdf
Series:	Economics Papers from University Paris Dauphine.
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Notes:	Published in Economics Letters, 2006, Vol. 92, no. 1. pp. 82-88.Length: 6 pages
Classification:	D10 - Household Behavior and Family Economics. General ; D64 - Altruism ; D82 - Asymmetric and Private Information
Source:	RePEc - Research Papers in Economics

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