onstitutions as the formal foundation of a country's legal and political system have important economic and political effects. Yet, we still know little about why constitutions set effective constraints on politicians in some societies, while being largely disregarded in others. Here, we ask if...

This chapter surveys economic perspectives on the separation of powers, revealing how contemporary research in political economics and the economic analysis of law conceptualize and assess institutional checks on government authority. Emphasizing principal-agent theory, it unpacks how...

A new consensus appears to have emerged among academics and policy practitioners: Governments can be made to respect constitutional rules by establishing and constitutionally entrenching watchdogs, such as anti-corruption commissions, electoral commissions, or ombudspersons. In this article, we...

The crucial importance of institutions for economic and social development has become part of the conventional wisdom in economics. In recent years, economists have become particularly interested in the potential role of informal institutions but measuring them remains a serious challenge. This...

Constitutional compliance varies significantly across countries and over time. One might, therefore, expect that constitutional change is systematically used to bring constitutional rules in line with constitutional practice. We investigate whether constitutional change indeed induces better...

Constitutions as the formal foundation of a country's legal and political system have important economic and political effects. Yet, we still know little about why constitutions set effective constraints on politicians in some societies, while being largely disregarded in others. Here, we ask if...