In this paper we study cultural diversity in values or personal norms concerning effort or work ethics, the related and observable diversity in behavior and its economic consequences. Our goal is to investigate the impact on this type of cultural diversity of primitive economic and behavioral...

New systems can be designed, developed, and managed as societies of agents that interact with each other by offering and providing services. These systems can be viewed as complex networks where nodes are bounded rational agents. In order to deal with complex goals, they require the cooperation...

A celebrated result of Abreu and Rubinstein [1] states that in repeated games, when the players are restricted to playing strategies that can be im- plemented by fnite automata and they have lexicographic preferences, the set of equilibrium payoffs is a strict subset of the set of feasible and...

The family of discounted Shapley values is analyzed for cooperative games in coalitional form. We consider the bargaining protocol of the alternating random proposer introduced in Hart and Mas-Colell (1996). We demostrate that the discounted Shapley values arise as the expected payoffs...

This paper focuses on oligopolistic markets in which indivisible goods are sold by multiproduct firms to a continuum of homogeneous buyers, with measure normalized to one, who have preferences over bundles of products. Our analysis contributes to the literature on private, delegated agency games...

This paper analyzes the impact of local and global interactions on individuals' action choices. Players are located in a network and interact with each other with perfect knowledge of their neighborhood and probabilistic knowledge of the complete network topology. Each player chooses an action,...

We analyze the effect of industrial espionage on limit-pricing models. We consider an incumbent monopolist engaged in R&D trying to reduce his cost of production and deter a potential entrant from entering the market. The R&D project may be successful or not and its outcome is a private...

We examine the interplay between a person's individual preference and the social influence others exert. We provide a model of network relationships with conflicting preferences, where individuals are better off coordinating with those around them, but not all prefer the same action. We test our...

We analyze industrial espionage in the context of entry deterrence. We consider a monopoly incumbent, who may expand capacity to deter entry, and a potential entrant who owns an inaccurate Intelligence System. The Intelligence System generates a noisy signal on incumbent’s actions and the...

We investigate the effect of punishment in a trust game with endowment heterogeneity in which the investor may punish the allocator at a cost. Our results indicate that the effect of the punishment crucially depends on the investor’s capacity of punishment, that is measured in our experiment...