Central banks around the world routinely engage in asset purchases in secondary markets as part of implementing monetary policy or enhancing market liquidity, but the effects of such interventions are not yet fully understood. We develop a multi-asset general equilibrium model in which the...

We analyze a principal-agent procurement problem in which the principal (she) is unaware some of the marginal cost types of the agent (he). Communication arises naturally as some types of the agent may have an incentive to raise the principal's awareness (totally or partially) before a contract...

We consider a principal who wishes to screen an agent with discrete types by offering a menu of discrete quantities and discrete transfers. We assume that the principal's valuation is discrete strictly concave and use a discrete first-order approach. We model the agent's cost types as...

Building on the analysis of Bonanno (2025) we introduce a simple modal logic containing three modal operators: a unimodal belief operator B, a bimodal conditional operator and the unimodal global operator □. For each AGM axiom for belief revision, we provide a corresponding modal axiom. The...

We extend Kuhn's Theorem to games of the extensive form with unawareness. This extension is not obvious: First, games of the extensive form with non-trivial unawareness involve a forest of partially ordered game trees rather than just one game tree. An information set at a node in one tree may...

We consider a disclosure game between a seller and a buyer. The seller knows the quality of a good, while the buyer does not. Before the buyer decides how many units to purchase, the seller can disclose verifiable information about the good. The better the information, the more the buyer is...

We study dynamic decentralized two-sided matching where players' preferences evolve due to unanticipated experiences. Stability requires no pairwise common belief in blocking, but unanticipated experiences can destabilize matchings. We show the existence of self-confirming outcomes that are...

We study the design of efficient mechanisms under asymmetric awareness and information. Unawareness refers to the lack of conception rather than the lack of information. Assuming quasi-linear utilities and private values, we show that we can implement in conditional dominant strategies a social...

We build on recent developments in the theory of money and liquidity to provide a qualitative and quantitative explanation for the well-known TIPS illiquidity vis-'a-vis non-inflation-protected Treasuries. Our model does not assume exogenous differences between the markets where the two assets...

When bidders bid on complex objects, they might be unaware of characteristics effecting their valuations. We assume that each buyer's valuation is a sum of independent random variables, one for each characteristic. When a bidder is unaware of a characteristic, he omits the random variable from...