The conventional wisdom is that a big jurisdiction sets a higher tax rate than a small jurisdiction. We show this result arises due to simplifying assumptions that imply tax-base sensitivities are equal across jurisdictions. When more than two jurisdictions compete in commodity taxes, tax-base...

The conventional wisdom is that a big jurisdiction sets a higher tax rate than a small jurisdiction. We show this result arises due to simplifying assumptions that imply tax-base sensitivities are equal across jurisdictions. When more than two jurisdictions compete in commodity taxes, tax-base...

Motivated by bidders' interests in concealing their private information in auctions, we propose an ascending clock auction for unit-demand assignment problems that economizes on bidder information revelation, together with a new general-purpose measure of information revelation. Our auction uses...

We establish the existence of pure strategy equilibria in games with discontinuous payoffs where the set of feasible actions of each player varies, also in a discontinuous fashion, as a function of the actions of the other players. Such games are used in modeling abstract economies and other...

This paper analyzes the outcome of international negotiations between asymmetric countries in the absence of efficient transfers. A main result is that there is a equity-efficiency tradeoff to reducing the flexibility of negotiations in making transfers across countries. Specifically, an...

We introduce a new ascending auction that allocates heterogeneous objects among bidders with purely private unit demands. Our auction design differs from existing dynamic auctions in a number of ways: it economizes on information solicited from bidders by requiring marginal bidders to reveal a...