This paper analyses the problem of aggregating judgments over multiple interconnected issues. We enrich the model by introducing the private information underlying individuals' judgments. Individuals share a common preference for reaching true collective judgments, but hold private information...

We analyze the problem of aggregating judgments over multiple issues from the perspective of whether aggregate judgments manage to efficiently use all voters' private information. While new in judgment aggregation theory, this perspective is familiar in a different body of literature about...

This paper analyses the problem of aggregating judgments when strategic voters hold privateinformation about which propositions are true and share a common preference for true collectivejudgments. We go beyond previous work by introducing logical interconnections between thepropositions. A...

Following Vartiainen (2007) we consider bargaining problems in which no exogenous disagreement outcome is given. A bargaining solution assigns a pair of outcomes to such a problem, namely a compromise outcome and a disagreement outcome: the disagreement outcome may serve as a reference point for...