We draw on the signaling and infomediary literatures to examine how media evaluations of CEO overcompensation (a negative cue associated with selfishness and greed) are affected by the presence of corporate philanthropy (a positive cue associated with altruism and generosity). In line with our...

Ludewig and Sadowski (2009) empirically examine the economic value of organizational capital. They use a comprehensive panel data set from the Institute for Employment Research (IAB) that provides standard information about inputs and outputs of the production process of German corporate...

For a large European data set, we find that in about 21% of all cases, cross-hierarchy pay schedules are inconsistent with tournament theory for managers from the highest echelons. For middle echelons, this number increases to 55%. We study whether social preferences of potential contestants...

We examine changes in the compensation of CEOs of German firms after the prohibition of insider trading (IT) in 1994 to test whether IT is a relevant compensation device. While we find that the performance elasticity of explicit CEO pay slightly increases subsequent to the IT law adoption for...

We examine whether anti-director laws and legal director liability rules matter for whether directors act diligently in setting the compensation of CEOs. The study uses a world-wide data set covering 27 countries for the period 1995 to 2005. Controlling for a number of legal and economic...

Admati and Pfleiderer (2006) demonstrate that under some conditions, linking CEO pay to share price performance may aggravate agency conflicts. Two fundamental conflicts are considered: the manager may take value-destroying, privately beneficial (bad) actions, or value-enhancing, privately...