A general version of the ZMW model of international tax competition is presented that confirms and extends the results of the existing literature about the choice of tax policy instruments in the symmetric case when the tax externality is positive for both countries. In the asymmetric case when...

A general version of the ZMW model of international tax competition is presented that confirms and extends the results of the existing literature about the choice of tax policy instruments in the symmetric case when the tax externality is positive for both countries. In the asymmetric case when...

Using perfectly competitive, general equilibrium models of international trade, specific import tariffs, specific export taxes, and ad valorem trade taxes are compared in a trade war. A trade war is modelled as a NE in trade policies, where each country can choose to use ad valorem trade taxes...

Using perfectly competitive, general equilibrium models of international trade, specific import tariffs, specific export taxes, and ad valorem trade taxes are compared in a trade war. A trade war is modelled as a NE in trade policies, where each country can choose to use ad valorem trade taxes...

The outcome of a trade war (with import tariffs and export subsidies) between two countries is analysed in a Cournot duopoly and in a Bertrand duopoly with differentiated products. The model allows for asymmetries between the countries in terms of competitiveness. When the two countries are...

The outcome of a trade war (with import tariffs and export subsidies) between two countries is analysed in a Cournot duopoly and in a Bertrand duopoly with differentiated products. The model allows for asymmetries between the countries in terms of competitiveness. When the two countries are...

Welfare with the maximum-revenue tariff is compared to free-trade welfare under perfect competition in the case of a large country able to affect its terms of trade; under Cournot duopoly with differentiated products; and under Bertrand duopoly with differentiated products. Under perfect...

Welfare with the maximum-revenue tariff is compared to free-trade welfare under perfect competition in the case of a large country able to affect its terms of trade; under Cournot duopoly with differentiated products; and under Bertrand duopoly with differentiated products. Under perfect...

The welfare effects of Brexit on the UK, the EU27 and the rest of the world are analysed in a model of international trade under oligopoly. A hard Brexit where the UK trades according to WTO rules is shown to decrease total UK welfare, to have an ambiguous effect on total EU27 welfare, and to...