The study analyzes whether the type of shareholding control (dispersed, shared, or dominant) affects agency conflicts by investigating the relationship between shareholding control, ownership concentration, and firm value. The sample is a panel data comprising 1977 firm-year observations from...

High ownership concentration makes controlling blockholders powerful enough to use private benefits of control and able to shape the corporate governance system to favor their own interests. This work aims to examine whether the nature of the ultimate firm owner affects the quality of corporate...

We analyze whether financial constraints of Brazilian firms are alleviated by ownership structure. More specifically, we study whether the presence of nonfinancial firms as shareholders of Brazilian firm mitigates financial constraints. We find that the presence of nonfinancial firms as...

This paper analyzes the incentives of large shareholders to implement the corporate governance system that favors their interests within a framework of highly concentrated ownership and poor legal protection for investors. A metric for corporate governance based on the fulfillment of...