When a firm finances a new project by issuing debt, it has an incentive to invest in excessively high-risk projects because shareholders enjoy all the benefits in case the project is successful but have limited liability when it fails. Anticipating such behavior, creditors may require a higher...

When a firm finances a new project by issuing debt, it has an incentive to invest in excessively high-risk projects because shareholders enjoy all the benefits in case the project is successful but have limited liability when it fails. Anticipating such behavior, creditors may require a higher...

This paper presents the results of an experimental study of takeover auctions with toeholds. Consistent with the theory, we find a positive effect of toeholds on bidding. Such an effect, however, is of a lower magnitude and the bidding premium function has an opposite slope than the theory...

This paper presents the results of an experimental study of takeover auctions with toeholds. Consistent with the theory, we find a positive effect of toeholds on bidding. Such an effect, however, is of a lower magnitude and the bidding premium function has an opposite slope than the theory...

This paper develops a model of preemptive jump bidding in common value takeover auctions. It shows that in a case of common values jump bidding increases the social surplus, and, under certain conditions, can lead to higher expected seller's revenue. It also demonstrates that an increase in...

This paper presents a short survey of theoretical research in takeover auctions. It concentrates on the models of preemptive jump bidding and the effect of toeholds as well as the models that investigate the combination of these two effects

This paper extends the Fishman (1988) model of preemptive jump bidding in private value takeover auction to auctions with common and affiliated values. We show that in the presence of a common value component, jump bidding equilibrium results in higher social surplus. Furthermore, we show that,...

This paper presents the results of an experimental study on how people use their private information to estimate the “fair” futures price, and how the quality of this information affects the traders' behavior and desire to trade. It finds that subjects are able to use their information...