A test can be said to ‘detect' an alternative hypothesis only if its power against this alternative exceeds its size. We use this principle to define the implicit null and alternative for a test. We analyze the performance of several tests for location and scale parameters

We specify an empirical framework to detect the effects of official intervention on real exchange rate dynamics. Using data for 27 advanced and emerging market economies, we find evidence that interventions are a near-universal practice; almost all countries intervene when real exchange rates...

The paper by Jayasri Dutta, James Sefton and Martin Weale presents an evaluation of the impact of capital income taxation in the United Kingdom. A general equilibrium model with overlapping generations is first set out and then calibrated using the British Household Panel Survey. The model is...

Recommended readings (Machine generated): Pranab Bardhan (1997), 'Corruption and Development: A Review of Issues', Journal of Economic Literature, XXXV (3), September, 1320-46 -- Jakob Svensson (2005), 'Eight Questions about Corruption', Journal of Economic Perspectives, 19 (3), Summer, 19-42,...

We study the efficient allocation of spending and taxation authority in a federation in which federal politicians are exposed to electoral uncertainty. We show that centralization may, but need not, result in a loss of electoral accountability. We identify an important asymmetry between positive...

We study the efficient allocation of spending and taxation authority in a federation in which federal politicians are exposed to electoral uncertainty. We show that centralization may, but need not, result in a loss of electoral accountability. We identify an important asymmetry between positive...

We study the efficient allocation of spending and taxation authority in a federation in which federal politicians are exposed to electoral uncertainty. We show that centralization may, but need not, result in a loss of electoral accountability. We identify an important asymmetry between positive...

We study the efficient allocation of spending and taxation authority in a federation in which federal politicians are exposed to electoral uncertainty. We show that centralization may, but need not, result in a loss of electoral accountability. We identify an important asymmetry between positive...

We study the efficient allocation of spending and taxation authority in a federation in which federal politicians are exposed to electoral uncertainty. We show that centralization may, but need not, result in a loss of electoral accountability. We identify an important asymmetry between positive...