We analyze international environmental agreements in a two-stage game when governments have homo moralis preferences à la Alger and Weibull, Econometrica 81, 2013, Alger and Weibull, Games Econom Behav 98, 2016). The countries base their decisions on the material welfare obtained on the...

Within a two-country model, this paper identifies a novel emission leakage channel that is caused by moral behavior of (atomistic) consumers. In a non-cooperative emission tax game between the countries, the leakage effect lowers the governments’ marginal benefit of emission taxation, so...

Within a two-country model, this paper identifies a novel emission leakage channel that is caused by moral behavior of (atomistic) consumers. In a non-cooperative emission tax game between the countries, the leakage effect lowers the governments' marginal benefit of emission taxation, so...

This paper analyzes international environmental agreements in three-stage games consisting of a membership subgame, the signatories' decision on the intensity of cooperation, and an emissions subgame. Signatories may act as Stackelberg leaders or play Nash. In the Stackelberg game, the highest...

This paper identifies missing markets for the sugar content of sugar‐sweetened beverages (SSBs) as a novel foundation of soft drink taxation. If the social marginal value of sugar content is negative, then missing price signals imply an inefficiently high sugar content. Efficiency is restored...

We analyze international environmental agreements in a two-stage game when governments have homo moralis preferences à la Alger and Weibull (2013, 2016). The countries base their decisions on the material payoff obtained on the hypothesis that all other countries act as they with predetermined...