We analyze international environmental agreements in a two-stage game when governments have homo moralis preferences à la Alger and Weibull (2013, 2016). The countries base their decisions on the material payoff obtained on the hypothesis that all other countries act as they with predetermined...

We analyze international environmental agreements in a two-stage game when governments have homo moralis preferences à la Alger and Weibull (2013, 2016). The countries base their decisions on the material payoff obtained on the hypothesis that all other countries act as they with predetermined...

The main insight of this paper is that moral behavior does not necessarily alleviate coordination problems or may even worsen them, if individuals possess different degrees of morality. We characterize heterogenous Alger-Weibull morality preferences in a canonical model of voluntary...

This paper analyzes international environmental agreements (IEAs) in three-stage games consisting of a membership subgame, the signatories’ choice of partial cooperation, and an emissions subgame. Signatories may act as Stackelberg leaders or play Nash. In the Stackelberg game, full...

This paper provides a new foundation of soft drink taxation. We abstract from externalities and internalities previously used to justify such taxation and, instead, emphasize that neither explicit nor implicit markets and prices for sugar content can be expected to emerge. Hence, in the absence...

In the standard theoretical literature on forming international environmental agreements (IEAs) countries use to be self-interested materialists and stable coalitions are small. This paper analyzes IEA games with countries that exhibit Kantian moral behavior. Countries may behave morally with...

Within a general equilibrium model, this paper identifies a novel animal welfare externality that occurs if the private animal friendliness in a market economy falls short of the social animal friendliness used by the social planner when determining the efficient allocation. The animal welfare...

This paper provides a new foundation of soft drink taxation. We abstract from externalities and internalities previously used to justify such taxation and, instead, emphasize that neither explicit nor implicit markets and prices for sugar content can be expected to emerge. Hence, in the absence...

In the standard theoretical literature on forming international environmental agreements (IEAs) countries use to be self-interested materialists and stable coalitions are small. This paper analyzes IEA games with countries that exhibit Kantian moral behavior. Countries may behave morally with...

This paper provides a new foundation of soft drink taxation. We abstract from externalities and internalities previously used to justify such taxation and, instead, emphasize that neither explicit nor implicit markets and prices for sugar content can be expected to emerge. Hence, in the absence...