We study transparency and reputation in a stylized investment game in which two senders interact with a receiver in a linear network. We analyse how ex-ante information (compatible with receiver’s reputation building) and ex-post information (making the receiver’s decisions transparent) make...

Democracies go to war with each other less frequently than dictatorships do with each other. This isan established empirical regularity. However, it is not clear whether there is a causal link betweendemocracy and peace. We use laboratory experiments to study whether there is a causal impact. We...

The standard approach to nominal illusion in Economics sees it as a transitory phenomenon, as economic agents eventually see through the nominal veil, making the right choices. Recent empirical studies suggest that money illusion may persist, distorting real prices in a variety of economic...

We analyse corporate tax avoidance in a stylized experimental Bertrand setting withhomogenous products and symmetric firms and consumers. More specifically, we investigate how market size and information disclosure of firms’ tax avoidance behaviour could reduce corporate tax avoidance. We find...

We transparency and reputation in a stylized investment game in which two senders interact witha receiver in a linear network. We analyze how ex-ante information (compatible with receiver’sreputation building) and ex-post information (making the receiver’s decision transparent) makesenders...

The standard approach to nominal illusion in Economics sees it as a transitory phenomenon, as economic agents eventually see through the nominal veil, making the right choices. Recent empirical studies suggest that money illusion may persist, distorting real prices in a variety of economic...