In a lab experiment, we investigate whether social information can improve the accuracy of self-assessments of relative performance. In particular, we compare the effectiveness of different types of social information: subjects either learn their close peers' (i) average absolute performance,...

We investigate how the transparency of selecting an agent for a task affects the agent's reciprocal behavior. In a laboratory experiment, we conduct a gift-exchange game with a random move representing the chance that a selected agent may not be available. We vary the transparency of the...

We experimentally investigate the path dependence of voluntary contributions in a public good game with heterogeneous agents who vary in their ability to increase the public good. More specifically, we analyze whether contribution norms observed in a first phase of the experiment under a...

We investigate how the transparency of selecting an agent affects the agent’s reciprocal behavior. In a modified gift-exchange game, agents either receive information about having (not) been selected or receive no such information at all, which allows to analyze reciprocity of agents who were...

In a lab experiment, we investigate whether social information can improve the accuracy of self-assessments of relative performance. In particular, we compare the effectiveness of di erent types of social information: subjects either learn their close peers' (i) average absolute performance,...