We examine how long-term life insurance contracts can be designed to incorporate uncertain future bequest needs. An individual who buys a life insurance contract early in life is often uncertain about the future financial needs of his or her family, in the event of an untimely death. Ideally,...

This paper analyzes the incentive properties of the standard and burden of proof for a finding of negligence, when evidence is imperfect and rests with the parties. We show that the "preponderance of evidence" standard provides maximal incentives to exert care. This holds even though litigants...

Two opposed parties seek to influence an uninformed decision maker. They invest in acquiringinformation and select what to disclose. The decision maker then adjudicates. We compare thisbenchmark with a procedure allowing adversarial cross-examination. A cross-examiner tests theopponent in order...

We analyze the interactions between social norms, the prevalence of regulated acts, and policies. These interactions are impacted by people's inability to directly observe actors' behavior. Norms are ineffective incentivizers when acts are committed either very frequently or very infrequently,...

A decision-maker relies on information of parties affected by her decision. These parties try to influence her decision by selective disclosure of facts. As is well known from the literature, competition between the informed parties constrains their ability to manipulate information. We depart...