In first-price sealed-bid auctions, a power probability weighting function is observationally equivalent to a model of constant absolute risk aversion. By comparing auctions with different ceilings on a computerized opponent’s bid space, we can separate subjective probability weighting and...

Delegating bargaining to an intermediary agent is common practice in many situations. The proposer, while not actively bargaining, sets constraints on the intermediary agent's offer. We study ultimatum games where proposers delegate bargaining to an intermediary agent by setting boundaries on...

The purpose of this study is to determine how self-driven (intrinsic motivators) and monetary incentives (extrinsic motivators) are mediated by effort to affect fundraising outcomes. This integration sheds light on crowding out between the two types of incentives as well the drivers of...

Problem definition: Dynamic forecasting models in auctions have fallen short on two dimensions: (i) the lack of an equilibrium model for final stage bids and (ii) the lack of a winner's curse (i.e., a tendency to overpay conditional on winning the auction) adjustment to allow bidders to account...

We study two variants of an allocation problem where two parties lay proportional claims to an asset, and an arbiter has a final say on allocation. The two variants we study vary by the incentives to the arbiter. In one variant, the arbiter is incentivized proportional to the payoff to the...

Supply chains today routinely use third parties for many strategic activities, such as manufacturing, R&D, or software development. These activities often include relationship-specific investment on the part of the vendor, while final outcomes can be uncertain. Therefore, writing complete...