A large fraction of online advertisements are sold via repeated second-price auctions. In these auctions, the reserve price is the main tool for the auctioneer to boost revenues. In this work, we investigate the following question: How can the auctioneer optimize reserve prices by learning from...

We introduce a novel stochastic control model for the problem of a service firm interacting over time with one of its customers. The firm has two service modes available, which differ in their expected reward rates as well as their volatilities (risk). The firm's objective is to maximize the...

We study a matching market with N agents who compete over M = αN opportunities. Agents must perform a costly inspection to verify compatibility prior to matching, and are willing to inspect their current favorite opportunity only if, should they find it compatible, they will be guaranteed a...

In the school choice market, where scarce public school seats are assigned to students, a key operational issue is how to reassign seats that are vacated after an initial round of centralized assignment. Practical solutions to the reassignment problem must be simple to implement, truthful and...

We study how to reduce congestion in two-sided matching markets with private preferences. We measure congestion by the number of bits of information that agents must (i) learn about their own preferences, and (ii) communicate with others before obtaining their final match. Previous results by...

Participants in matching markets face search and screening costs when seeking a match. We study how platform design can reduce the effort required to find a suitable partner. We study a game-theoretic model in which "applicants" and "employers" pay costs to search and screen. An important...

We designed and implemented a new joint seat allocation process for undergraduate admissions to over 500 programs spread across 80 technical universities in India, including the prestigious Indian Institutes of Technology (IITs). Our process is based on the well known Deferred Acceptance...