In early round investments by venture capital syndicates, the venture capitalists (VCs) which compose the syndicate often have very different levels of experience. In later round VC syndicates, often no VC from the earlier round syndicate is present. We show that a theory of informational...

In early round investments by VC syndicates, the VCs which compose the syndicate often have very different levels of experience. In later round VC syndicates, often no VC from the earlier round syndicate is present. We show that a theory of informational hold-up by the incumbent syndicate can...

This paper examines two prominent approaches to design efficient mechanisms for debt renegotiation with dispersed bondholders: debt exchange offers that promise enhanced liquidation rights to a restricted number of tendering bondholders (favored under U.S. law), and collective action clauses...

This paper examines two prominent approaches to design efficient mechanisms for debt renegotiation with dispersed bondholders: debt exchange offers that promise enhanced liquidation rights to a restricted number of tendering bondholders (favored under U.S. law), and collective action clauses...

Early round venture capitalists can strategically threaten not to participate in a follow-on round of financing: Non-pursued certification by an incumbent venture capitalist known for accurately spotting quality projects, would send a negative signal to alternative financiers. This threat of...