We ask why we observe multiple layers of decision-making in fund management with investors, sponsors, fund managers, and consultants, even if additional decision-makers are costly and do not contribute to superior performance. In our model, an investor hires a wealth manager (“sponsor”), who...

We study the restructuring of the labor force after mergers and acquisitions. Overall restructuring is large. Net employment of targets declines by more than half within two years after acquisitions relative to a matched sample, and is concentrated in targets that close all establishments. There...

This paper develops a unified theory of blockholder governance and the voting premium. It explains how and why a voting premium emerges in the absence of takeovers and controlling shareholders. The model features a minority blockholder and dispersed shareholders who trade shares in a competitive...

We study shareholder voting in a model in which trading affects the composition of the shareholder base. Trading and voting are complementary, which gives rise to self-fulfilling expectations about proposal acceptance and multiple equilibria. Prices and shareholder welfare can move in opposite...

This paper develops a unified theory of blockholder governance and the voting premium, in a setting without takeovers and controlling shareholders. A voting premium emerges when a minority blockholder tries to influence the composition of the shareholder base by accumulating votes and buying...

This paper analyzes how trading after shareholder meetings changes the composition of the shareholder base. Analyzing daily trades, we find that mutual funds reduce their holdings if their votes are opposed to the voting outcome. Trading volume is high even when stock prices do not change, peaks...

We examine the role of employee health in Private Equity buyouts using employee-level data on employment, wages, medical prescriptions, and health expenditures of more than 55,000 buyout employees. Employees with a lower health status before the buyout face the most substantial losses of income...

We hypothesize that labor participation in governance helps improve risk sharing between employees and employers. It provides an ex-post mechanism to enforce implicit insurance contracts protecting employees against adverse shocks. Results based on German establishment-level data show that...

We test two complementary theories of optimal trading strategies by analyzing transaction pat-terns of corporate insiders: Information-based theories predict that investors trade faster if they compete with others for exploiting the same information. Liquidity-based theories predict the...

This paper analyzes stealth trading by corporate insiders in US equity markets. Stealth trading is the practice to break up trades into sequences of smaller trades. We find that stealth trading is pervasive and distinguish two explanations. The first argues that insiders break up trades in order...