We build a simple formal model of governance. Investments and control rights over assets and labor are fully contractible, but final production decisions are ex ante uncontractible, and ex post negotiations are inefficient. If sunk costs are low, suppliers own assets and trade takes the form of...

We build a simple formal model of governance. Investments and control rights over assets and labor are fully contractible, but final production decisions are ex ante uncontractible, and ex post negotiations are inefficient. If sunk costs are low, suppliers own assets and trade takes the form of...

Received wisdom holds that income rank matters for life satisfaction, but causal evidence on the nature and impact of income comparisons is limited. We randomize individuals from a representative sample of mid-career Finns to receive personal rank information from one of several reference...

Received wisdom holds that income rank matters for life satisfaction, but causal evidence on the nature and impact of income comparisons is limited. We randomize individuals from a representative sample of mid-career Finns to receive personal rank information from one of several reference...

We theoretically investigate how the application of unanimity rule can lead to inefficient delay in collective decision making. We do so in the context of a distributive multilateral bargaining model featuring strategic pre-commitment. Prior to each bargaining round, players can declare a...

We theoretically investigate how the application of unanimity rule can lead to inefficient delay in collective decision making. We do so in the context of a distributive multilateral bargaining model featuring strategic pre-commitment. Prior to each bargaining round, players can declare a...

Distributive justice principles are commonly used in societal debates to support policy positions and argue for their legitimacy. Prominent formal incarnations of such principles are the Rawlsian, Utilitarian, Efficient transfer (e.g. Pigou-Dalton), and Leaky-bucket transfer (e.g. Hammond)...

We theoretically investigate the effects of strategic pre-commitment in multilateral dynamic bargaining. Each round features a commitment stage in which players can declare that they will reject any proposal giving them less than a self-imposed threshold. Such declarations bind in the ensuing...