Diversity of team members and discrimination against certain member types are important strategic factors in competition between teams. The paper develops a framework where team managers strategically select diversity of their teams that subsequently compete with each other. At the time of...

We develop a model to derive an optimal price for a bundle of two goods when buyers are risk averse and uncertain about the valuation of each good. In theory, the optimal bundle price depends not only on the probability of a positive valuation of each good, but also on the correlation between...

We analyze the first model of a group contest with players that are heterogeneous in their risk preferences. In our model, individuals' preferences are represented by a utility function exhibiting a generalized form of constant absolute risk aversion, allowing us to consider any combination of...

In this paper, we ask a fundamental design question in the theory of contests: Should contestants and reward money be pooled into a single grand contest, or should they be divided into parallel subcontests? We theoretically explore optimal divisioning using Tullock’s lottery contest framework...