Because of discrete bid increments, bidders at electronic auctions engage in shading instead of revealing their valuations, which would occur under the commonly assumed second-price rule. We demonstrate that misspecifying the pricing rule can lead to biased estimates of the latent valuation...

Because of discrete bid increments, bidders at electronic auctions engage in shading instead of revealing their valuations, which would occur under the commonly assumed second-price rule. We demonstrate that misspecifying the pricing rule can lead to biased estimates of the latent valuation...

The authors construct an intertemporal model of rent-maximizing behavior on the part of a timber harvester under potentially multidimensional risk as well as geographical heterogeneity. Subsequently, the authors use recursive methods (specifically, the method of stochastic dynamic programing) to...

Abstract By making gathering large samples of data (Big Data) almost trivial, the Information Revolution has changed fundamentally how many scientists now conduct empirical research. The explosion in the variety and volume of information that is Big Data has in many cases altered both the...

We describe and compare numerical methods used to approximate equilibrium bid functions in models of auctions as games of incomplete information. In such games, private values are modelled as draws from bidder-specific type distributions and pay-your-bid rules are used to determine transactions...