We consider a model of executive compensation in which CEOs have power to influence their compensation and test its implications using CEO compensation data from Execucomp. In the proposed model, CEOs endogenously determine their equity and salary compensation by maximizing the expected utility...

While the literature appeals to efficiency arguments from agency theory to explain the relative rise of CEO equity compensation, prior work has given less focus to CEO pay contracts based on equity and cash incentives that directly (analytically) maximize the total return of firm owners. The...

The venture industry relies extensively on convertible contracts that allow VCs to convert their investments into an equity stake or a fixed debt position at a future date. We study convertible venture investments exposed to failure risk and valuation uncertainty using a double-hazard framework...

This study constructs finance journal rankings and classifications using the active scholar assessment (ASA) methodology with nested effects regression estimation. We observe some interesting changes over the past nine years and also compare the new ASA journal rankings with Scimago’s SJR...

An important question for firm management and markets is whether superior capabilities to mitigate the impact of adverse business scenarios leads to higher firm performance and valuation. We address this question by using a new broadly applicable methodology based on the insight that effective...

This paper studies how critical entrepreneurial finance outcomes such as the investment return and equity division are shaped by venture characteristics, financier risk preferences and competitive searching. Our analysis uses a double-hazard agency model in which financiers determine the equity...

This research focuses on the ultimate impact of hedging effectiveness on firm performance. Successful risk management in firms should lead to a lesser occurrence of lower business outcomes than higher outcomes (e.g., positive skewness in quarterly earnings per share). We empirically estimate the...