Since a fixed exchange rate regime is a fixed price system, there is no theoretical reason to presume that the foreign exchange market clears, particularly during a speculative attack. This paper shows that equilibria where we allow for the possibility of such corner solutions are a superset of...

This paper presents a simple statistical exercise to provide a benchmark for the degree of electoral stagnation without direct officeholder benefits or challenger scare-off effects. Here electoral stagnation arises solely due to incumbent-quality advantage where the higher quality candidate wins...

Since a fixed exchange rate regime is a fixed price system, there is no theoretical reason to presume that the foreign exchange market clears, particularly during a speculative attack. This paper shows that equilibria where we allow for the possibility of such corner solutions are a superset of...

Political campaign spending ceilings are purported to limit the incumbent's ability to exploit his fundraising advantage. If the challenger does not have superior campaign effectiveness, in contrast to conventional wisdom, we show that the incumbent always benefits from a limit as long as he has...