Chapter 1. Economics and Environmental Degradation -- Chapter 2. Environmental Externalities and their Internationalization Through Voluntary Approaches -- Chapter 3. Monetary Valuation of the Environment -- Chapter 4. Assessing Environmental Policy Instruments -- Chapter 5. International...

In this paper we demonstrate how the impure public good model can be converted into a pure public good model with satiation of private consumption, which can be handled more easily, by using a variation of the aggregative game approach as devised by Cornes and Hartley (2007). We point out the...

In order to achieve the commonly agreed emission reduction target, the European Commission developed binding national targets for each member state until 2030 and called upon the member states to submit National Energy and Climate Plans to ensure increased transparency for the respective...

It is explored in this paper how – depending on the agents’ preferences – an unequal income distribution may lead to a higher public good supply in a non-cooperative Nash equilibrium than in a cooperative Lindahl equilibrium that arises from a balanced income distribution. The degree of...

The effects of extreme weather events, such as heat waves and droughts, are taken into account in both global and European policies. Accordingly, the protection of critical infrastructures and in particular, the resilience of the energy sector was the subject of intense research. There are...

Recent international climate negotiations suggest that complete agreements are unlikely to materialize. Instead, partial cooperation between like-minded countries appears a more likely outcome. In this paper we analyze the effects of such partial cooperation between like-minded countries. In...

We extend the standard public good provision model to allow players to either like or dislike the public characteristic. Those who dislike it are able to take actions to reduce its level. We present conditions under which the existence of a unique non-cooperative equilibrium is retained, and...

Matching mechanisms are regarded as an important instrument to bring about Pareto optimal allocations in a public good economy and to cure the underprovision problem associated with private provision of public goods. The desired Pareto optimal interior matching equilibrium, however, emerges only...