We propose a mechanism which implements a unique solution to the bargaining problem with two players in subgame-perfect equilibrium. Players start by making claims and accept a compromise only if they cannot gain by pursuing their claim in an ultimatum. The player offering the lowest resistance...

We propose a mechanism which implements a unique solution to the bargaining problem with two players in subgame-perfect equilibrium. Players start by making claims and accept a compromise only if they cannot gain by pursuing their claim in an ultimatum. The player offering the lowest resistance...

We investigate the mechanism that provides the optimal decision rule for two agents making joint decisions. It is shown that, a special rectangular mechanism with two sided screening, elicit correct information when agents?preferences are private information. Such mechanism is presented as a...

Institutional and Financial Incentives for Social Insurance provides both an empirical and a theoretical account of the main difficulties presently threatening social insurance systems in most industrialized countries. It analyzes the remedies that have been discussed and sometimes introduced...