We experimentally investigate the path dependence of voluntary contributions in a public good game with heterogeneous agents who vary in their ability to increase the public good. More specifically, we analyze whether contribution norms observed in a first phase of the experiment under a...

Models of job tournaments and competitive workplaces more generally predict that while individual effort may increase as competition intensifies between workers, the incentive for workers to cooperate with each other diminishes. We report on a field experiment conducted with workers from a...

This article theoretically and experimentally examines the twin problems of free-riding and coordination failure faced by blood banks, by investigating the effects of information provision on the efficiency of blood donation. We augment a standard linear public goods game, incorporating the...

We study voluntary contribution behavior of individuals who vary in their ability to contribute to a joint project under different information scenarios. We investigate a situation with two types who vary only in their external marginal return (low and high). Results of a laboratory experiment...

When the provision of public goods requires contributions from individuals with different abilities, solicitation of efficient voluntary contributions from heterogeneous individuals becomes important. Blood banks are one such public resource. Blood banks perform a challenging task in ensuring a...

In addition to showing that student measures of social preference, a concern for outcomes achieved by other reference agents, are quite different from those obtained in the field with participants who face social dilemmas in their daily lives, we find links between the social preferences of our...