This paper studies reinsurance contracting and competition in a continuous-time model with ambiguity. The market consists of one insurer and two reinsurers, who apply a generalized expected-value premium principle and a generalized variance premium principle to price reinsurance contracts,...

In this paper, we consider a continuous-time version of a reinsurance chain, which is sequentially formed by $n+1$ companies, with the first company being the primary insurer and the rest being reinsurers. Because of possible model misspecification, all companies are ambiguous about the original...

We study a dynamic Stackelberg differential game between a buyer and a seller of insurance policies in a spectrally negative Lévy framework, in which both parties are ambiguous about the intensity and severity of insurable losses. Both the buyer and seller aim to maximize their expected wealth,...

Cao et al. (2021) consider a Stackelberg differential game for insurance under model ambiguity. In the main body of the paper, they measure ambiguity via squared-error divergence; then, in the appendix, they briefly consider entropic divergence. In this paper, we show a strong connection between...

We solve a Stackelberg differential game between a buyer and a seller of insurance policies, in which both parties are ambiguous about the insurable loss. Both the buyer and seller maximize their expected wealth, plus a penalty term that reflects ambiguity, over an exogenous random horizon....