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~institution:"University of Bonn, Germany"
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Adverse Selection
2
Adverse selection
2
Assymetric information
1
Bequest
1
Ex Post Information
1
Information Structure
1
Life-cycle models
1
Market Performance
1
Monopolistic market
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Savings
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adverse selection
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statistical discrimination
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Broecker, Thorsten
1
Kessler, Anke
1
Kessler, Anke S.
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Lülfesmann, Christoph
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Menchik,Paul Irvine,Owen Jianakoplos,Nancy
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Schnedler, Wendelin
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University of Bonn, Germany
National Bureau of Economic Research
132
C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers
53
Volkswirtschaftliche Fakultät, Ludwig-Maximilians-Universität München
52
CESifo
26
Université Paris-Dauphine (Paris IX)
18
Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University
13
Institut für Volkswirtschaftslehre, Wirtschaftswissenschaftliche Fakutät
13
Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA)
13
Centre Interuniversitaire sur le Risque, les Politiques Économiques et l'Emploi (CIRPÉE)
10
Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra
10
HAL
10
Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE), École des Sciences Économiques de Louvain
9
EconWPA
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International Monetary Fund (IMF)
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Department of Economics, Oxford University
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Economics Institute for Research (SIR), Handelshögskolan i Stockholm
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Faculdade de Economia, Universidade do Porto
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Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research
7
Université Paris-Dauphine
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Center for Financial Studies
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Collegio Carlo Alberto, Università degli Studi di Torino
6
Institut für Volkswirtschaftslehre, Johannes-Kepler-Universität Linz
6
Instituto Valenciano de Investigaciones Económicas (IVIE)
6
Barcelona Graduate School of Economics (Barcelona GSE)
5
Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science (CMS-EMS), Kellogg Graduate School of Management
5
Centro Studi di Economia e Finanza (CSEF)
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Dipartimento di Economia "Marco Biagi", Università degli Studi di Modena e Reggio Emilia
5
Institut de Recherche Économique et Sociale (IRES), École des Sciences Économiques de Louvain
5
London School of Economics (LSE)
5
Stanford Institute for Economic Policy Research (SIEPR), Stanford University
5
Agricultural and Applied Economics Association - AAEA
4
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4
Centre Interuniversitaire de Recherche en Analyse des Organisations (CIRANO)
4
Department of Economics, Boston College
4
Department of Economics, Iowa State University
4
Ekonomiska forskningsinstitutet <Stockholm>
4
Fachbereich Wirtschaftswissenschaften, Universität Konstanz
4
Forschungsstelle zur ökonomischen Analyse des Rechts, Abteilung Wirtschaftswissenschaft
4
Institut ekonomických studií, Univerzita Karlova v Praze
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Discussion Paper Serie A
3
Bonn Econ Discussion Papers
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RePEc
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1
The Virtue of Being Underestimated: A Note on Discriminatory Contracts in Hidden Information Models
Schnedler, Wendelin
-
University of Bonn, Germany
-
2001
A standard hidden information model is considered to study the influence of the a priori productivity distribution on the optimal contract. A priori more productive (hazard rate dominant) agents work less, enjoy lower rents, but generate a higher expected surplus.
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005032208
Saved in:
2
Optimal Contracting with Verifiable Ex Post Signals
Kessler, Anke
;
Lülfesmann, Christoph
;
Schmitz, Patrick
-
University of Bonn, Germany
-
2000
We study an
adverse
selection
problem in which information that is imperfectly correlated with the agent's type becomes …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10004968366
Saved in:
3
Revisiting the Lemons Market
Kessler, Anke S.
-
University of Bonn, Germany
-
1996
This paper extends the standard competitive
adverse
selection
model by allowing for qualitatively different information …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10004968175
Saved in:
4
Determinants of intended bequests
Menchik,Paul Irvine,Owen Jianakoplos,Nancy
-
University of Bonn, Germany
-
1988
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005028263
Saved in:
5
A monopolistic market for melons
Broecker, Thorsten
-
University of Bonn, Germany
-
1987
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005028333
Saved in:
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