This paper investigates how framing manipulations affect the quantity and quality of decisions. In a field experiment in elementary schools, 1.377 pupils are randomly assigned to one of three conditions in a multiple-choice test: (i) gain frame (Control), (ii) loss frame (Loss) and (iii) gain...

Implicit contracts can mitigate moral hazard in labor, credit and product markets. The enforcement mechanism underlying an implicit contract is the threat of exclusion: the agent fears that he will lose future income if the principal breaks off the relationship. This threat may be very weak in...

Implicit contracts can mitigate moral hazard in labor, credit and product markets. The enforcement mechanism underlying an implicit contract is the threat of exclusion: the agent fears that he will lose future income if the principal breaks off the relationship. This threat may be very weak in...

This paper investigates how framing manipulations affect the quantity and quality of decisions. In a field experiment in elementary schools, 1.377 pupils are randomly assigned to one of three conditions in a multiple-choice test: (i) gain frame (Control), (ii) loss frame (Loss) and (iii) gain...

The problem of choosing an optimal toolkit day after day, when the distribution of values of different toolkits is uncertain and can only be observed by carrying different toolkits, is a multi-armed bandit problem with non-independent arms. Accordingly, except for very simple specifications,...

This paper continues our study of heuristics employed to choose dynamically tools to put in a toolkit, where the value of any tool can be discovered only by choosing it. This is a multi-armed bandit problem with “arms” that are not independent, hence it is a problem for which the optimal...