Search Results - subject:"Coalition Structures"

On the relationship between Shapley and Owen values

López, Susana; Saboya, Martha - In: Central European Journal of Operations Research 17 (2009) 4, pp. 415-423

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008515659

Stable Coalition Structures with Fixed Decision Schme

Haeringer, Guillaume - Departament d'Economia i Història Econòmica, … - 2000

Stable Coalition Structures with Fixed Decision Scheme Guillaume Haeringer This version: 7th July 2000 Comments and … is to study the stability of coalition structures, in non-cooperative and cooperative frameworks. We advocate that … becomes harder to predict, and nding stable coalition structures is more intricate. Economic analysis o ers a wide variety of …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005572143

Coalition formation in games without side payments

Centrone, F.; Meo, C. - In: Mathematical Social Sciences 56 (2008) 3, pp. 314-320

We study the endogenous formation of coalitions for games without side payments by embodying a notion of stability à la Hart and Kurz [Hart, S., Kurz, M., 1983. Endogenous formation of coalitions. Econometrica 51, 1295-1313] into the classical Shapley [lambda]-transfer value. Our analysis...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005175389

A theory of endogenous coalition structures

Ray, Debraj; Vohra, Rajiv - 1998

concerned with the characterisation of equilibrium coalition structures. We develop an algorithm that generates (under certain …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011608412

Strategic formation of coalitions

Ma, Jinpeng - 1998 - This version March 10, 1998

. Each individual has personal preferences over the set of all coalition structures. We study the strategy proof core and von … such a mechanism. We show in an example that the single-valued core is manipulable if coalition structures allow more than …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011577015

Compatibility and Market Structure for Network Goods

Economides, Nicholas; Flyer, Fredrick - Economics Department, Stern School of Business - 1997

This paper analyzes the economics of industries where network externalities are significant. In such industries, firms have strong incentives to adhere to common technical compatibility standards, so that they reap the network externalities of the whole group. However, a firm also benefits from...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005101687

Deux prix Nobel pour la théorie des jeux

Schmidt, Christian - Université Paris-Dauphine (Paris IX) - 2006

The paper is a survey of the Aumann's and Schelling's main contributions to game theory. For Aumann, a distinction is made between his works devoted to cooperative and non cooperative games. As for Schelling, pure coordination games and focal points are underlined on one hand, and the collective...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010786614

ANC Analytical Payoff Functions for Networks with Endogenous Bilateral Long Cheap Talk

Nieva, Ricardo - Econometric Society - 2004

We derive an almost non cooperative (ANC) analytical payoff function for all three-agent Aumann-Myerson (1988) games, and tractable ones exist for all three-agent A-M-like network games with any fixed valuation, in contrast to restricted results in the literature, if at all. Unlike link proposal...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005702641

Equilibrium binding agreements under diverse behavioral assumptions

Diamantoudi, Effrosyni - In: Economic Theory 22 (2003) 2, pp. 431-446

This paper extends the work of Ray and Vohra [3]. It ascertains which partitions of players will emerge and what actions will these players choose under each partition, when they can sign binding agreements and their actions have externalities. The emphasis, however, is placed on situations with...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005753448

Farsighted Stability in Hedonic Games

Diamantoudi, Effrosyni; Xue, Licun - School of Economics and Management, University of Aarhus

We investigate how rational individuals partition themselves into different coalitions in "hedonic games" [see Banerjee, Konishi and S”nmez (1998) and Bogomolnaia and Jackson (2000)], where individuals' preferences depend solely on the composition of the coalition they belong to. We show that...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005787457