We examine a setting of independent private value auctions where bidders can covertly acquire gradual information about their valuations. We demonstrate that a dynamic pivot mechanism implements the rst-best information acquisition and allocation rule. We apply our results to a commonly used...

We examine a setting of independent private value auctions where bidders can covertly acquire gradual information about their valuations. We demonstrate that a dynamic pivot mechanism implements the rst-best information acquisition and allocation rule. We apply our results to a commonly used...

We study mediated many-to-many matching in markets in which valuations evolve over time as the result of shocks, learning through experimentation, or a preference for variety. The analysis uncovers the key tradeoffs that platforms face in the design of their matching protocols. It shows that the...

We study mediated many-to-many matching in markets in which valuations evolve over time as the result of shocks, learning through experimentation, or a preference for variety. The analysis uncovers the key tradeoffs that platforms face in the design of their matching protocols. It shows that the...