Well-behaved densities are typically log-convex with heavy tails and log-concave with light ones. We discuss a benchmark for distinguishing between the two cases, based on the observation that large values of a sum X1 + X2 occur as result of a single big jump with heavy tails whereas X1,X2 are...

Well-behaved densities are typically log-convex with heavy tails and log-concave with light ones. We discuss a benchmark for distinguishing between the two cases, based on the observation that large values of a sum X1+X2 occur as result of a single big jump with heavy tails whereas X1,X2 are of...

This article shows that, for any transferable utility game in coalitional form with nonempty coalition structure core, the number of steps required to switch from a payoff configuration out of the coalition structure core to a payoff configuration in the coalition structure core is less than or...

For cooperative games with transferable utilities (TU games) excess functions e : R2 ! R1 whose values e(x(S); v(S)); S N are relative negative utilities of coalitions S with respect to their payos x(S) = Pi2S xi are dened. The excess values for the class of two-person games are dened as those...