Contents: Introduction to the handbook of experimental game theory / C. Mónica Capra, Rachel T.A. Croson, Mary L. Rigdon and Tanya S. Rosenblat -- Part I: A sampling of methodological innovations -- 1. Stochastic game theory for social science: A primer on quantal response equilibrium / Jacob...

Recent research has cast some doubt on the general validity of outcome-basedmodels of social preferences. We develop a model based on cognitive dissonance thatfocuses on the importance of self-image. An experiment (a dictator game variant)tests the model.First, we nd that subjects whose choices...

We exploit a controlled frameless laboratory experiment to study settlement negoti-ations and the plainti¤’s decision to raise a lawsuit in case of an impasse. We …nd thatgreater variance in court outcomes increases the litigation rate and lowers the settlementrate. This latter …nding goes...

We present an experiment designed to test the Modigliani-Miller theorem. Applyinga general equilibrium approach and not allowing for arbitrage among firmswith different capital structures, we find that, in accordance with the theorem, participantswell recognize changes in the systematic risk of...

Loewenstein (1996, 2005) identifies an intrapersonal empathy gap. In the respectiveexperiments, subjects make choices with delayed consequences. When enteringthe state where these consequences would unfold, they get the possibility to revisetheir initial choice. Revisions are more substantial...

Why is it that well-intentioned actions can create persistent conflicts? While norms are widely regarded as a source for cooperation,this article proposes a novel theory in which the emergence of normscan be understood as a bargaining process in which normative conflicts explain the nally...

According to the accountability principle a person’s fair allocation takes into accountthe input-relevant variables she can influence, like effort, but not the variablesshe cannot influence, like a randomly assigned exogenous factor. This study is basedon a real effort-task experiment, where...

We experimentally show that current models of reciprocity are in-complete in a systematic way using a new variant of the ultimatumgame that provides second-movers with a marginal-cost-free punish-ment option. For a substantial proportion of the population, the de-gree of first-mover unkindness...

In a bilateral oligopoly where strategic buyers source a good from competing suppliers over time, buyers often have an incentive to sustain competition while suppliers benefit from excluding rival suppliers. We model this situation as a two period asymmetric cost Bertrand duopoly, where in the...