predictions differ from expert benchmarks. We elicit forecasts from 127 professional economists and a representative sample of 6 …-reported effort, and the use of structured reasoning, but remains well below expert levels. We show that scalable design features …, including the provision of well-calibrated numerical anchors and monetary incentives to rise effort, improve non-expert …

predictions differ from expert benchmarks. We elicit forecasts from 127 professional economists and a repre-sentative sample of 6 …, self-reported effort, and the use of structured reasoning, but remains well below expert levels. We show that scalable … non-expert predictions, with effects comparable in magnitude to tertiary education or structured reasoning. Our findings …

expert should design verifiable advice - such as whether to commission a diagnostic test of different accuracy - when the …-Bayesian way. The expert both informs the agent about underlying risk and persuades the agent away from choices driven by bias. In … that the expert’s payoff need not be monotone in informativeness: intermediate information can reduce welfare relative to …

two different expert market settings: First, one in which consumers cannot rely on information from personal experience … with the expert, reflecting markets in which consumer-expert interactions are often first-time and infrequent (e ….g. specialist visits in healthcare markets). Second, one in which consumers have personal experience with the expert, reflecting …