We study a problem of individual manipulation in an impartial culture (IC) framework using computer modeling. We estimate the degree of manipulability of ten positional voting rules in the case of multiple choice for 3 and 4 alternatives.

Standard theory assumes that voters’ preferences over actions (voting) are induced by their preferences over electoral outcomes (policies, candidates). But voters may also have non-consequentialist (NC) motivations: they may care about how they vote even if it does not affect the outcome. When...

In a recent paper to appear in Journal of Economic Theory [Kotaro Suzumura and Yongsheng Xe, "Characterizations of Consequentialism and Non-consequentialism"], an analytical framework was developed, which allowed us to characterize the concept of consequentialism and non-consequentialism. To...

Is gift-exchange inevitably to be crowded out by impersonal market exchange? The presence of a thick-market externality indicates that this is indeed likely to be the case. But reciprocity or gift-exchange induces social relations. The utility function is extended in order to take account of...