We investigate a process of decision-making in a multi-period winner-take-all contest, in which competing players simultaneously choose among actions with different levels of risk every period. Strategic risk-taking is analyzed in isolation from effort choices, and, according to expected utility...

In a tournament, agents form coalitions, and the coalition with largest power wins the tournament. We introduce a new solution concept for the tournaments, called no threat equilibrium (NTE). NTE is a partition of the agents, where prudent and farsighted agents have no incentive to deviate....

We consider a model of common-value sequential voting in which voters are differentiated in their information. We ask whether the intuition as in the simultaneous-voting case---voters with no information would vote so as not to influence the outcome---would be valid to imply long voting in our...

We investigate whether tournament prizes that depend on joint output ("variable prize tournaments") can alleviate the sabotage problem which is otherwise inherent in tournament struc- tures. In a game-theoretical model with three contestants, we compare fixed-prize tournaments with tournaments...

This paper studies how the cost of delay and voting order affect agents' decisions in a unanimity voting mechanism. Specifically, we consider two-voter conclaves with commonly known preferences over two alternatives, the cost of delay, and the following novelty: each voter has a subjective...

We investigate if, and why, an initial success can trigger a string of successes. Using random variations in success in a real‐effort laboratory experiment, we cleanly identify the causal effect of an early success in a competition. We confirm that an early success indeed leads to increased...

This paper uses a beauty contest game to test the gender differences in strategic reasoning. I conducted two experiments in China: one in a classroom setting with student subjects and the other online with the general population. In the first experiment, I found evidence of gender differences in...

We generalize Klumpp, Konrad and Solomon’s model (KKS Model) to multi-contestant sequential Colonel Blotto Games with prize functions where any contestant’s prizes only depend on this contestant’s own number of winning rounds. We show that with weakly monotonic prize functions and CSFs...

We study signaling in dynamic contests with heterogeneous players. A privately-informed challenger faces a sequence of rivals of known types. The type of future rivals determines which signal the challenger wants to produce, whereas the strategic response of current rivals determines the extent...