The 2×2 game is the simplest non-trivial model of strategic interaction: there are two players, each has two strategies, and each has a strict preference ranking over the four possible outcomes. For models of play that depend only on the ranking of the outcomes, the catalog of 2×2 games...

We study a generalization of the static model of Kyle with two risk neutral insiders to the case where each insider is partially informed about the value of the stock. First, we provide a necessary and sufficient condition for the uniqueness of the linear Bayesian equilibrium. Specifically, we...

We consider the stability under adaptive learning of the complete set of solutions to the basic linear forward looking model in which the current value of the state variable depends linearly on the (subjectively) expected value of the state next period and the coefficient of the expected state...

We examine the nonlinear one-step forward-looking model, in which the current state is a function of the (subjective) expected value of a nonlinear function of the state next period. Stationary Markov Sunspot Equilibria (SSEs) are known to exist near an indeterminate steady state, i.e. when the...