Patent settlements between rivals restrain competition in many different ways. Antitrust requires them to be "proportional" in that their anti-competitive effects are commensurate with the firms' expectations about (counterfactual) patent litigation. Because these expectations are private and...

Concentration-based screens for horizontal mergers, such as those employed in the US DOJ and FTC Horizontal Merger Guidelines, play a central role in merger analysis. However, the basis for these screens, in both form and level, remains unclear. We show that there is both a theoretical and an...

The direct effect of EU directives was recognised more than 40 years ago. However, directives are not by definition binding for individuals, which is one of the reasons why the CJEU was reluctant to enable to rely on directives in the litigations between private parties. This has created...

This paper uses network theory to argue that the consequences of horizontal ownership by large investment institutions are more complicated than, and sometimes completely the opposite of, what conventional economic theory predicts. Horizontal ownership occurs when a large investment institution,...

We examine the profitability of cross-ownership in an oligopolistic industry where firms compete as Cournot rivals. We consider a symmetric cross-ownership structure in which a subset of k firms engage in cross-shareholding and each firm has an equal silent financial interest in the other firms,...

Economic analysis of competition regulation is most developed in the domain of horizontal mergers, and modern agency guidelines reflect a substantial consensus on the appropriate template for merger assessment. Nevertheless, official protocols are understood to rest on a problematic market...

The goal of antitrust policy is to protect and promote a vigorous competitive process. Effective rivalry spurs firms to introduce new and innovative products, as they seek to capture profitable sales from their competitors and to protect their existing sales from future challengers. In this...