Access price regulation is used in telecommunications to prevent a vertically integrated firm, which controls an essential input, from raising the rivals' costs. When the authorities remove the access price as a strategic tool, it becomes optimal for the regulated firm to use the transfer price...

This paper examines how regulators behave in markets when there is a tension between retail competition and cross subsidy. Using retail and wholesale prices from Regional Bell Operating Company territories, and price-cost margins as a proxy for political influence, we find that private interests...

Im vorliegenden Beitrag soll das Regulierungsrisiko für den Unternehmenswert der Telekom AG inhaltlich begründet und näherungsweise quantifiziert werden. Die Quantifizierung des Risikos wird mit Hilfe des Shareholder-Value-Ansatzes vorgenommen, indem ein unmittelbarer Zusammenhang zwischen...

Telecommunications regulation in the U.S. is replete with a system of subsidies and taxes. Because of budgetary spending limits, Congress is unable to increase general taxes to pay for social programs and thus funds these programs from taxes on specific sectors of the economy. In this paper I...

This paper analyses the emergence of new institutions for governing the provision of Internet-based business services. It draws upon John R Commons' account of the emergence of working rules in support of new forms of collective action.

Using the classical Hotelling model, this paper analyzes the incentive for a CATV service provider to bundle broadband internet services when entering the broadband internet services market. In addition, the effect of such service bundling by an entrant on the market incumbent with ownership...