We study the design of market information in competing-mechanism games. We identify a new dimension, private disclosures, whereby the principals asymmetrically inform the agents of how their mechanisms operate. We show that private disclosures have two important effects. First, they can raise a...

We study a duel game in which each player has incomplete knowledge of the game parameters. We present a simple, heuristically motivated and easily implemented algorithm by which, in the course of repeated plays, each player estimates the missing parameters and consequently learns his optimal...

This work highlights a previously overlooked factor that contributes to bias in private inflation forecasts-ignorance of confidential monetary rules. Additionally, it examines how this ignorance indirectly affects policy rate settings. The model proposed reconciles biases in two key forecast...

I investigate the design of effort-maximizing mechanisms when agents have both private information and convex effort costs, and the designer has a fixed prize budget. I first demonstrate that it is always optimal for the designer to utilize a contest with as many participants as possible....