We propose a macro-finance model in which inflation, growth, and the policy rate are driven by unobservable long-run trends and transitory cycles that investors must infer from aggregate data. Their subjective estimates of these trends, and the uncertainty surrounding them, are priced into the...

We study firms' financial and real decisions after an exogenous change in their interest rate beliefs induced by a survey experiment with an information treatment. Firms revise their expectations downward after learning about the European Central Bank's policy rate. Moreover, we find a reduction...

This work highlights a previously overlooked factor that contributes to bias in private inflation forecasts-ignorance of confidential monetary rules. Additionally, it examines how this ignorance indirectly affects policy rate settings. The model proposed reconciles biases in two key forecast...

We study the design of market information in competing-mechanism games. We identify a new dimension, private disclosures, whereby the principals asymmetrically inform the agents of how their mechanisms operate. We show that private disclosures have two important effects. First, they can raise a...

We study a duel game in which each player has incomplete knowledge of the game parameters. We present a simple, heuristically motivated and easily implemented algorithm by which, in the course of repeated plays, each player estimates the missing parameters and consequently learns his optimal...