This paper studies how organizations manage the social comparisons that arise when their employees' pay and tasks, and hence their status vis-à-vis peers, differ. We show that under a "pay transparency policy", the organization may compress pay and distort the employees' tasks to minimize...

This paper studies how organizations manage the social comparisons that arise when their employees' pay and tasks, and hence their status vis-à-vis peers, differ. We show that under a "pay transparency policy", the organization may compress pay and distort the employees' tasks to minimize...

This paper develops a positive model of informal contracting in which rewards and punishments are not determined by an ex ante optimal plan but instead express the ex post moral sentiments of the arbitrating party. We consider a subjective performance evaluation problem in which a principal can...

This paper develops a positive model of informal contracting in which rewards and punishments are not determined by an ex ante optimal plan but instead express the ex post moral sentiments of the arbitrating party. We consider a subjective performance evaluation problem in which a principal can...

In this paper we investigate the relationship between news sources and media firms. Although empirically important, this channel for supply-driven media bias has not previously been analyzed in economics literature. We model the relationship as an informal contract based on trust and punishment,...

In this paper we investigate the relationship between news sources and media firms. Although empirically important, this channel for supply-driven media bias has not previously been analyzed in economics literature. We model the relationship as an informal contract based on trust and punishment,...