In this paper, we explore the reproducibility of the König et al. (2022) paper on the timing of bill initiation under coalition governments and validate its scope condition by expanding the analysis to an additional government and country, namely the United Kingdom's Conservative-Liberal...

There are multiple models of party formation in the political economy literature. However, most of these works consider individuals as parties and do not model parties as a group of candidates. In this paper, we follow the latter approach and assume that parties form as a result of mutually...

Electoral thresholds in the context of parliamentary elections are an instrument for preventing the fragmentation of parliaments and facilitate the formation of a coalition government. However, the clauses also introduce distortions and modify the equality of electoral votes in an election. In...

This is the first out of four papers devoted to the 2021 German federal elections continuing our analysis of the 2009, 2013 and 2017 Bundestag elections by the methods of the mathematical theory of democracy. This one estimates the policy representation ability of the 39 parties that...

We study a game theoretic model of a parliamentary democracy under proportional representation where ideologically motivated citizen groups form parties, voting occurs and governments are formed. We study the coalition governments that emerge as functions of the parties' seat shares, the size of...