We study how AI affects compensation and job design when performance depends on workers' non-contractible effort. In a principal–agent model with limited liability, AI reduces effort costs but disproportionately lowers the cost of achieving satisfactory performance. This raises the incentive...

We examine the impact of monetary and non-monetary incentives, individually and combined, on residential electricity consumption. A field experiment in Switzerland provided all participants with access to a custom-developed app offering feedback on electricity use and energy-saving tips. In...

Agency theory holds that managerial discretion over stakeholder decisions creates agency costs through altruistic redistribution. We test this claim in a principal-agent experiment where agents choose effort and transfers affecting a third party under unenforceable flat-wage contracts. We find...

Performance-contingent pay raises productivity, yet in the German Socio-Economic Panel (SOEP) only about 16% of workers report receiving performance pay, with the incidence being roughly seven percentage points higher among university graduates than among non-graduates. This coexistence of low...

We conducted a within-subject laboratory experiment in which participants decided whether to experience physical discomfort for charity, with or without additional personal compensation. Acceptance decreased with greater discomfort and increased with both larger charitable donations and personal...