We present and analyze a local interaction model where agents play a bilateral prisoner's dilemma game with their … beyond this set). We find that the [Eshel, I., L. Samuelson and A. Shaked, 1998, Altruists, Egoists and Hooligans in a Local … Interaction Model, Am. Econ. Rev 88] result that polymorphic states are stochastically stable in such a setting is not robust. In …

We study how players in a local interaction hawk dove game will learn, if they can either imitate the most succesful …

no longer hold in a context characterized by local interaction. Individuals are distributed around a circle and enjoy the …

This paper studies the repeated Prisoner’s Dilemma in a local interaction setup. We construct a sequential equilibrium … defined expectation system, which is a more compact way than machines to describe strategies in the local interaction setup …

We study how players in a local interaction hawk dove game will learn, if they can either imitate the most succesful …

We study how players in a local interaction hawk dove game will learn, if they can either imitate the most succesful …

We study how players in a local interaction hawk dove game will learn, if they can either imitate the most succesful …

-dimensional local interaction. Players are assumed to interact with their two neighbors and to imitate actions with the highest average …